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The pay determining process of CEOs of UK higher education institutions is modelled using 
three econometric methodologies applied to a large and unique dataset for the academic 
years 1997/98 through to 2005/06. A gender differential in pay is detected and this differential 
remains robust across the specifications reported and across higher education sub-sectors. 
There is evidence that CEOs with industrial work experience and those who have been 
employed by a higher education body earn more than their counterparts without these 
attributes. We also find that CEOs are rewarded favourably on the termination of their 
contracts. There is little evidence that institutional characteristics influence pay after 
controlling for institution fixed effects. There is only limited evidence that they are rewarded 
for the ‘performance’ of the institutions they manage, but are rewarded favourably by 
increasing the volume of tuition fees. There is some support for ‘tournament theory’ as an 
explanation for the determination of CEO pay in this labour market. 
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The pay awards granted to UK ‘Vice Chancellors’ has increasingly come under public 
scrutiny since 1994 when UK higher education institutions (HEIs) were required to 
disclose publicly the annual pay of their CEO.
1 For instance in 2006, thirty three UK 
Vice Chancellors received an average annual salary of £225,505 and the highest paid 
university head earned £322,000 (Times Higher Education Supplement (THES)). 
Recent evidence on the national trends in the pay of CEOs of HEIs and full-time 
academics in the UK, between 1997 and 2006, suggests that there is a substantial 
difference in the level of their pay and a widening of the differential over time. The 
average pay of CEOs of HEIs increased by 37% in real terms over the period 
compared to a 13% increase received by academics, and on average the pay of CEOs 
of HEIs was above that of full-time academics by a factor of 3.6 over the period 
(ASHE, various years). These differences have been the major focus of criticism 
vented in the media and by lecturers’ unions with the charge that the pay awards 
granted to CEOs of HEIs have been ‘outrageous’, ‘shameless’ and  ‘despicable’.
2 
However, between 2002 and 2006 the pay of CEOs that head HEIs was, on average, 
about 83% of the annual pay of full-time CEOs of large private sector enterprises
3 and 
about 16% greater than the pay of senior executives. We also note that over the period 
CEOs of large private sector enterprises received a 23% real pay increase. Their 
counterparts in higher education only received a 17% real increase (ASHE, various 
years).  
 
It is argued that the leadership and managerial skills needed to lead and run large 
complex HEIs are similar to the executive skills needed to manage and lead large 
private sector companies (Dolton and Ma, 2003; Farnham and Jones, 1998; Bargh et 
al. 2000). In this sense the pay awards granted to CEOs of HEIs in the UK can be 
seen as  justified and not excessive on the basis that their remuneration should be 
                                                 
1 ‘CEO’ will be used as a generic term to describe all heads of UK higher education institutions (unless 
otherwise stated) encompassing: Vice Chancellors; Principals; Rectors; Directors and Provosts. 
2 See for example the following articles published in THES: ‘Large rises at top as pay dispute grips 
sector (10
th March 2006); ‘25% wage hike for v-cs’ (10
th March 2006); ‘Heads enjoy 100% rise in pay 
over ten years’(25
th February, 2005); ‘V-c pay survey: Thriving v-cs net 6.1% rise in wages’ (20
th 
February 2004); ‘Disparity is a disgrace’ (1
st March 2002); ‘Union fury at ‘shameless’ v-c pay rises’ 
(26
th January, 2001); ‘Pay rises for university chiefs more than double increases given to their staff’ 
(26
th January 2001).  
3 Organisations employing 500+ workers in a single site or in multiple sites. 
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comparable to that received by private sector CEOs with similar executive 
responsibilities (Tarbert et al, 2007). Furthermore, UK HEIs differ greatly in terms of 
their history, organisational structure, size and the markets they cater for (Dolton and 
Makepeace, 1989). One would expect CEO pay to also reflect these differences. 
 
Despite a high level of public interest in the pay of CEOs of HEIs only a few studies 
on their pay determining process have been undertaken. This study adds to the 
literature in several respects. First, it contributes new evidence on the determination of 
pay of CEOs that lead and head UK higher education institutions. On a more general 
level it also contributes to the relatively small body of research on the determinants of 
CEO pay in the public sector.   
 
Second, using a large and unique dataset it is possible to extend the period of analysis 
to 2006. Previous research on the determination of CEO pay covered a period up to 
and including the academic year 2002 (see Tarbert et al 2007; Dolton and Ma, 2003). 
Moreover, during the period between 2002 and 2006 the HE sector has seen radical 
change. For instance, over half the institutions classified as University Colleges, Arts 
and/or Higher Education colleges were granted independent degree awarding powers 
by the Privy Council and subsequently assumed ‘university’ status. Many of these 
institutions and the specific personal characteristics of their CEOs are included in this 
analysis.  
 
Third, the dataset employed is more comprehensive and complete in its coverage of 
UK higher education institutions and the personal characteristics of their CEOs than 
previously employed by researchers with similar research interests. For instance, due 
to missing data, the number of observations used by Dolton and Ma (2003) falls from 
1007 to 357 for the eight academic years of coverage when information on 291 CEOs’ 
personal characteristics are combined with institutional characteristics. Our dataset 
covers ten years and contains 1476 observations with complete information on CEOs’ 
characteristics and the characteristics of their respective institutions between 1997 and 
2006. We are therefore able to offer more representative estimates of the influence 
that individual CEOs’ characteristics and institutional characteristics have on the CEO 




Fourth, we are able to explore the relationship between CEO performance and pay 
using a unique set of publicly available performance indicators. These indicators 
include financial performance variables but also variables that capture institutions’ 
success in ‘widening participation’ in accordance with current UK government policy 
(DfES, 2003). Such analysis is absent in existing research and it is therefore possible 
to offer a novel contribution to the literature in this respect.  The next section provides 
a brief review of the relevant literature. This is followed by a description of the key 
features of the data followed by a description of the methodology employed. The 
results are presented in the penultimate section and a summary of the conclusions is 




The relationship between executive pay and the factors that are assumed, a priori, to 
influence such rewards has received substantial attention in the academic literature 
and this interest has grown considerably over the last two decades. This research is 
almost entirely concerned with executive pay in the private sector.
4 In addition to 
human capital theory (Mincer, 1975; Becker, 1993), three general approaches to 
explain CEOs’ relatively high levels of pay can be identified in the literature: the 
principal-agent approach, tournament theory, and the theory of managerial power. A 
further motivation for this research is to identify which of these theories best explains 
the CEO pay determining process in UK higher education given data constraints. 
 
In certain respects the pay of CEOs in UK higher education can be viewed as a 
principal-agent problem where it is necessary to motivate the agent to act in the 
principal’s best interest, by designing ‘optimal contracts’ where executive effort is 
unobserved (see Mirrlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1985, 1986; Jensen and 
Zimmerman 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gregg, et al. 1993; Conyon, et al. 1995; 
Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon, et al. 2000). This theoretical framework points 
to a link between executive pay and the ‘size’ and ‘performance’ of the firm. Two 
major problems are encountered in applying this framework to the pay of CEOs in 
UK higher education. First, it is not possible to specify precisely who the principals 
are. It can be argued that the council, senate or governing body are the principals as 
                                                 




the CEO has to report to these ‘committees’ on institution affairs. Moreover, the CEO 
is also an executive member of these committees and is therefore in a position to 
influence decisions. In this sense, the CEO can be both principal and agent (Dolton 
and Ma, 2003).  Second, it is often difficult to determine what exactly constitutes 
‘performance’ in higher education (e.g. income generation, research/teaching quality, 
student enrolment, etc.) and indeed what elements of performance are to be attributed 
to CEO effort. 
 
The second approach applies tournament theory to explain the high level of executive 
pay (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). The basic framework assumes that 
promotion lotteries provide the necessary incentives for high ranking executives 
where executive effort is again unobservable. Firms and organisations are prepared to 
spend large sums of money on CEO salaries and benefits to reward capability because 
it also serves to motivate workers at all levels in the firm to work hard for promotion. 
Workers are ranked according to their relative performance and winners secure the 
‘prize’, known in advance, in terms of higher pay and the opportunity to participate in 
subsequent promotional tournaments. The ultimate prize is the promotion to the rank 
of CEO. Employees are assumed to exert effort to increase the likelihood of securing 
the ‘prize’, and the effort expended depends on the differential in pay between a high 
ranked position and a lower rank, the number of competitors in the lottery and the 
likelihood of winning (see O’Reilly, et al. 1988; Main, et al. 1993; Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1994). It is possible that the pay package awarded to high ranking 
university officers (e.g. Vice Chancellor) is influenced by the pay packages received 
by those in a lower ranked position (e.g. Pro Vice Chancellor) or simply by the 
presence of highly paid academics/staff. Moreover, we may expect that a vacant CEO 
position in a prestigious institution, noted for its quality in research and teaching, will 
attract more candidates for the post than a lower ranked HEI on the basis of these 
attributes. Thus the likelihood of winning the ‘tournament’ and securing the post in a 
highly ranked HEI is lower in comparison, and pay will be higher in these institutions 
compared to a lower ranked institution.   
 
The third approach, the theory of managerial power, focuses on the influence that 
CEOs have over their own pay package. The strength of this influence will depend on 
their relationship with the board of directors and/or the remuneration committee 
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(Main and Johnston, 1993; Main et al, 1995; Blanchard, et al. 1994; Conyon, 1997; 
Newman and Mozes, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Conyon, 2006; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2006, 2003). There is also some evidence that the composition of 
the board or remuneration committee and the level of pay enjoyed by its constituent 
members can influence awards (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002; Forbes and Watson, 
1993). However, CEOs are constrained from unfavourable rent seeking behaviour by 
the amount of ‘outrage’ a proposed compensation package is expected to generate 
among relevant outsiders. Such sentiments are likely to cost CEOs embarrassment and 
loss of reputation and will act to constrain excessive awards (Johnson et al. 1997). 
These considerations may influence the pay of many CEOs in UK higher education. It 
is possible that the composition of the senate/board of governors or remuneration 
committee and their relationship with the CEO could influence the remuneration 
package. Indeed outside pressure from government, the media and labour unions 
could act as a constraint on excessive pay awards. However, the data required to test 
this theory in the context of this paper are not publicly available.  
 
The case of CEO pay in UK higher education  
 
Research into the determination of CEO pay in UK higher education is very limited.
5 
Bainbridge and Simpson (1996), using a cross section of 64 CEOs of UK universities 
for the academic year 1993/94, found some evidence of university income (income 
from research grants and fees), the public status and the academic discipline of the 
CEO exerting significant effects on pay. Moreover, they found that tenure exerted a 
mild but significant negative effect.  
 
Dolton and Ma (2003) using a similar formulation of the earnings function estimated 
the earnings relationship for CEOs of UK HEIs using a data panel covering eight 
academic years from 1993/1994  through 2001/02. They found evidence that CEOs’ 
human capital variables (age, certain academic qualifications and academic and public 
                                                 
5 There has been some empirical research on the determinants of pay of college presidents in the US. 
For example Ehernburg et al. (2001) found a weak link between pay and institution performance (i.e. 
the presidents success in securing private donations). However, they do find some evidence linking the 
president’s tenure and experience with pay and evidence linking institution size, type and income to 
pay though these effects are not robust across the specifications reported. Cornell (2002) found that 
elite US universities do not find it difficult to recruit suitable candidates for the position of president 
even though they are paid significantly less and have similar skills and abilities to top corporate CEOs.   
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honours), had a positive and significant effect on pay. They found little evidence that 
previous experience as a CEO influenced pay. In terms of institution characteristics 
they found some evidence of university type and size influencing pay. However, it 
should be stressed that the significance and impact of these variables on pay varied 
across the econometric specifications reported. They also included controls for 
institution performance. These included financial performance indicators and the 
results from the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). They found that some of these 
controls had a positive and significant effect on pay. They also found some evidence 
that the presence of highly paid staff in an institution had a positive effect on CEO 
pay. 
 
In a more recent study Tarbert et al. (2007), using CEO salary data for CEOs that led 
pre-1992 (old) universities and post-1992 (new) universities and a modest set of 
controls for university size and performance for the period 1997-2002, found only 
limited evidence that university performance and size had an effect on pay. However, 
they do detect that the presence of ‘highly’ paid staff (earning over £50,000)
6 in the 
institution and the average pay of CEOs heading comparable higher educational 




The data employed in this paper were collected from a variety of sources that are 
listed in the data Appendix. The dataset contains information on 291 CEOs who led 
148 UK HEIs from the academic year 1995/96 though to 2005/06.
7 The definitions of 
the variables and their associated summary statistics are detailed in Table A1 of the 
appendix.  Specifically, there is information on CEO pay, their individual specific 
characteristics, and institutional-level characteristics. The pay data and all other 
financial data used are adjusted to 1998 prices. As noted in the introduction, UK HEIs 
differ widely in many respects. For the purpose of this analysis institutions are 
classified into one of five broadly defined higher education sub-sectors. The majority 
of the sample consists of universities classified as ‘old’ (40.5%) and ‘new’ (27.7%). 
                                                 
6 Whether £50K is indeed ‘high pay’ is debatable; mean academic pay over the period covered by 
Tarbert et al. (2007) was about £33K (ASHE (various years)). 
7 Institutions not included in the sample are very small specialist institution (e.g. Institute of Legal 
Studies, Institute of Germanic & Romance Studies, and Conservatoire for Dance and Drama) and the 
private sector University of Buckingham. 
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These are followed by institutions classified as ‘other’ (15.6%) and colleges of Art, 
Music or Drama (12.2%). The least represented group are those institutions classified 
as Medical and Business Schools (3.9%). 
 
Annual data on CEO pay were obtained from the Times Higher Education Supplement 
(THES) for the period 1996/97 through 2005/06. The salary reported includes any 
performance-related pay and an estimated value of benefits in kind but exclude 
pension contributions made by the institution. It is not possible to distinguish between 
the elements that make up the final pay from the information provided. The mean pay 
over the sample period is £117,769 in 1998 prices. We note that over the period 
average pay increased by about 37.4% in real terms, and this represents a 3.2% real 
annual increase. This increase is not evenly spread across all CEOs. Chief Executive 
Officers in the bottom 10
th percentile have experienced the smallest increase in real 
pay (29.9%) and those in the top 90
th percentile experienced the largest (44.2%). The 
sample data also reveal that CEOs of ‘old’ universities are paid, on average, 
significantly more (£129,850) than their counterparts in ‘new’ universities (£121,685). 
It is also interesting to note that on average the CEOs of institutions classified as an 
Art, Music or Drama College receive the lowest average pay (£87,689) and the CEOs 
of colleges of Medical and Business Schools are amongst the highest paid (£146,812). 
 
Human capital variables such as age, tenure, educational background, and experience 
are expected to enhance the pay of the CEO, a priori. The data reveal that the average 
age is just over 57 and there is a distinct male dominance (88.4%). The average length 
of tenure is just under six years, but for those who completed their term in office 
(either through retirement or resignation) it is just over eight years. The data also 
reveal that a large proportion of CEOs have an academic specialism in the social 
sciences (45.3%) and physical sciences (29.9%), and 68.4% have been awarded a PhD 
or equivalent qualification. The sample data also reveal that 76.9% of all CEOs were 
externally appointed 
 
One would expect that academic and public esteem is positively related to pay. Three 




8 a fellowship to a Royal Society or Academy, or equivalent; and/or 
the award of a knighthood. Such individuals may be expected to enhance the 
institution’s reputation, increase the potential for private sector funding opportunities, 
and bring with them a set of network contacts. As expected a high proportion of all 
CEOs, just under 86%, have reached the grade of professor, about 58% are fellows of 
the Royal Society of Arts or Sciences, British Academy, or equivalent academic 
society and 14.1% have been awarded a knighthood.  
 
The nature of CEOs’ previous work experience is defined by four broad categories 
that describe the general nature of work the incumbent was engaged in for the ten 
years prior to being appointed CEO. The majority (85.3%) have a recent career 
history in academia, followed by those who were formerly employed in the civil 
service (6.6%), and then by those who were employed in the private sector (5.5%).  
 
The CEO’s pay is hypothesised to be positively related to institution size and 
complexity. Two variables are used to capture these effects: the number of academic 
cost centres, and the number of full time equivalent (FTE) academic staff. On average 
institutions have just over fifteen cost centres, reflecting the type and nature of diverse 
activities undertaken within each institution. The average number of FTE academic 
staff is about 854 in the sample.  
 
We include several controls to test for ‘tournament’ effects: the proportion of senior 
academic staff to all academic staff (17%); the proportion of professors to all 
academic staff (8%) and the proportion of staff paid over £100,000 per annum to all 
academic staff. It is hypothesised that the presence of a medical school will attract 
highly paid clinicians and in accordance with tournament theory will drive up the pay 
of the CEO. We include two controls to capture this effect: the proportion of 
undergraduate medical students to all undergraduate students (14.4%) and the 
proportion of postgraduate medical students to all postgraduate students (10.4%).  
 
We expect CEOs’ pay to be positively related to university income, as a reward for 
sound financial management and leadership. We employ four income variables, 
                                                 
8 It should also be noted that a professorship often carries responsibilities that can be best described as 
managerial e.g. Dean of School, head of a research centre/institute/department, and can also include 
senior administrative tasks, see Bargh et al. (2000). 
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income from: funding council grants; tuition fees and educational grants; research 
grants and contracts; and sundry sources. In addition we include a variable for the 
proportion of overseas (non-EU) tuition fees to tuition fees and funding council grants 
from domestic sources. It is hypothesised that successful institutions, in terms of 
research and teaching, will attract a significant proportion of overseas students. We 
may expect CEOs to be rewarded for their success in this respect. Overseas tuition 
fees relative to other tuition fees and grants for teaching purposes account for 8.3% of 
such funds.  
 
Performance indicators that capture research and teaching quality, the rate of 
undergraduate attrition and graduate employability, and indicators that capture 
‘widening participation’ (DfES, 2003) are excluded from the primary analysis. The 
summary statistics and definitions for these additional variables are reported in table 
A2 of the Appendix. It is conceded that these variables may impact on CEO earnings 
but are not available for the entire sample period and moreover are not available for 
many of the institutions found in the Medical/Business school, colleges of Art, Music 
and Drama, and the ‘other’ HEI sub-sectors. However, they are included in a 
secondary analysis that uses the subset of ‘new’ and ‘old’ universities. We note that 
‘old’ universities perform better on average than new universities in terms of their 
average RAE scores, 5.37 and 3.37 respectively. The drop out rate for first year 
students in ‘old’ universities (9.3%) is, on average, lower than in ‘new’ universities 
(15.5%). However, ‘new’ universities attract a higher proportion of students from 
lower socio economic groups (34.8% v. 22.2%), state schools and colleges (93.7% v. 
80.2%), and students from areas where participation in higher education is historically 
low (17.4% v. 10.6%).  
 
4. Methodology  
 
The primary theme of this paper is to estimate the relationship between CEO pay and 
their personal characteristics and the characteristics of the institution in which they are 
employed. Three econometric methodologies are employed for this purpose. First, a 
conventional pooled OLS regression approach is employed where observations are 
pooled across both time and institutions. The basic model can be expressed as:  
 10 
 




ijt tD ϕ ijt            [1]   
 
where: wijt is the natural log of real annual pay for the i
th CEO in institution j at time t;  
Xit is a k×1 vector of CEO specific pay determining variables, for the i
th individual 
(e.g. age, gender, educational background, esteem and previous work experience and 
training); Zjt is a k×1 vector of  institution specific pay determining characteristics for 
the j
th institution (e.g. institution type, size, hierarchical structure and income 
variables); Wjt is a  location specific pay determining  condition for the j
th
  institution 
(average house prices);  D is a set of time specific dummies introduced to capture time 
effects; β, γ, δ and φ are unknown wage equation parameters; uit is an error term 
assumed to conform with standard distribution assumptions, uit ~ iid(0,σ
2).  
 
The pooled OLS may not be the most efficient estimator to employ if there is 
variation either across or between individuals/institutions over time. The more 
efficient and consistent estimators to employ would be the fixed effects (FE) or 
random effects (RE) estimators. These estimators allow for unobserved heterogeneity 
that characterises individual CEOs and/or institutions that are assumed constant over 
time. They therefore allow us to control for the potential bias in the estimated 
coefficients associated with omitted 'unobservable’ variables. In the context of this 
research we model the random and fixed effects at the institutional rather than the 
individual level using the covariates described in expression [1].   
 
Similar formulations of expression [1] are used to explore the relationship between 
CEO pay in ‘old’ and ‘new’ universities and the ‘performance’ of the institution they 
run. The vector of CEO characteristics Xit is excluded from this analysis and 
institution performance indicators (i.e. variables capturing teaching and research 
quality and student participation rates) are included in the vector Zjt.   
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We now turn to the process of CEOs’ pay determination. The estimates for the pooled 
OLS, fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE) specifications, for the primary 
analysis are reported in Table 1. The natural logarithm of real annual pay is used as 
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the dependent variable in the three specifications reported. All specifications include 
controls for CEOs’ personal characteristics, institution characteristics
9 and the higher 
education sub-sector in which the institution operates.
10 The natural logarithm of the 
average county level house price and a set of time dummies are also included in each 
specification. We first note that all three specifications fit the data reasonably well 
using the appropriate goodness of fit measure reported at the bottom of Table 1. What 
is apparent from these models is that the significance of the included regressors is 
model dependent. On the basis of an F-test the FE specification is preferred to the 
pooled regression model.
11 Similarly, on the basis of a Hausman test we reject the null 
of RE in favour of the FE specification.
12 Thus the FE is our preferred specification 
and we focus our discussion on the estimated coefficients reported for this model. The 
pooled and RE models are presented to aid comparison with previous research. 
 
The coefficients on a majority of the academic year dummies are well determined and 
are jointly significant at a conventional level. In general the point estimates suggest 
substantial pay inflation since the academic year 1999/2000. For instance, the point 
estimate for the academic year 2004/05 suggests CEO pay increased by 17.3% in real 
terms, on average and ceteris paribus, compared to average pay in the base year. 
There was a marginal decrease in the rate of increase in pay between the base year 
and 2005/06 (17.1%). This particular result may be influenced by the adverse media 
coverage of CEOs pay during the lecturer’s union industrial action in March 2006.
13 
This particular relationship is detected in all the specifications reported.  
 
Several of the estimated coefficients for the CEOs’ personal characteristics are well 
determined. A significant gender effect (male = 1) is detected, the point estimate 
suggests that male CEOs, on average and ceteris paribus, are paid 8% more than their 
female counterparts. This might be taken as evidence of gender inequality in this 
                                                 
9 Non-nested J-Tests were conducted on specifications based on personal characteristics only (t = 13.02 
[0.00]) and a specification based on the institution characteristics only (t = 9.27 [0.00]). These tests fail 
to reject the null of no influence of the predicted values from the alternative specification in both cases 
suggesting that an optimal approach is to combine both sets of variables. 
10 As the variables that capture the higher education sub-sector are time invariant they are excluded 
when estimating the FE model. 
11 F(147, 1282) = 3.86 [0.00]. 
12  = 71.07 [0.00]. A Breusch-Pagan test for RE was also employed which also decisively rejects 





13 See for example ‘Large rises at top as pay dispute grips sector’ (THES, 10
th March 2006). 
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particular labour market, but it should be noted that female CEOs represent only about 
12% of the sample. There is no evidence that CEOs’ age influences pay.
14 However, 
this particular result may be picking up a quality effect where the bidding for talent, 
through the award of higher pay, is not dependent on age. 
 
The award of a PhD (or equivalent qualification) is found to have no significant effect 
on pay. This result may be considered unsurprising given that CEOs, on average, are 
appointed in their mid-fifties and many were awarded their PhDs in their mid to late 
twenties. As a consequence remuneration committees (and appointing committees) 
may place more weight on the academic discipline, work experience, training, and the 
labour market returns to a specific academic specialism than the type of educational 
qualification attained in determining pay. However, there is no evidence that 
academic discipline influences pay and as a group these variables are not jointly 
significant at a conventional level in the FE specification (F = 0.36 [0.78]). This may 
be due to the fact that a Vice Chancellorship or equivalent is generally a late career 
choice and the influence of subject specialism is more likely to affect appointment 
than pay.  
 
Two coefficients on the ‘university attended’ variables are well determined and as a 
group they are jointly significant at a conventional level. The largest differential in 
pay is found between CEOs that have been educated overseas and their Oxbridge 
counterparts. The point estimate suggests that those educated overseas earn about 
7.5% more, on average and ceteris paribus, than those with an Oxbridge background. 
However, this effect is driven by the small proportion of CEOs who have this attribute 
and who are amongst the highest paid in the sample. Moreover, this may reflect a 
global shortage of suitable individuals to fill vacancies. The coefficient on the London 
University control is also well determined and suggests that CEOs with this attribute 
are paid about 5% more, on average and ceteris paribus, than CEOs in the base 
category.  
 
Turning to variables that capture personal/academic esteem we find that the award of 
a professorship has a negative impact on pay. This result suggests that CEOs who 
                                                 




hold professorships are paid about 3.5% less, on average and ceteris paribus, than 
CEOs who are not professors. It is not clear why this may be but may be due to the 
high proportion of professors that lead low pay HEIs. For instance 76% of CEOs that 
lead ‘other’ HEI have professorships and the equivalent figure for the heads of Art, 
Music or Drama Colleges is 78%.
15  
 
There is evidence that CEOs who have been employed by a public sector higher 
educational body are paid more than their counterparts who have a career history 
more firmly rooted in academia. The point estimate suggests that CEOs with this 
particular background are paid about 7.5% more on average and ceteris paribus, than 
CEOs in the base category.  We also detect a well determined coefficient on the 
‘industry’ variable. The point estimate suggests that CEOs with private sector 
industrial experience are paid 8.3% more, on average and ceteris paribus, than their 
counterparts in the base category. This result is in line with our priors and may reflect 
the need to offer high salaries to attract individuals with the necessary managerial and 
leadership skills from the private sector.  
 
There is no evidence that previous experience of leading a HEI either in the capacity 
of a CEO or deputy CEO affects pay. In terms of the controls included to capture 
‘current employment’ we find no evidence that the length of tenure impacts 
significantly on pay.
16 This result is in conflict with that reported by Dolton and Ma 
(2003) who detect a non linear downward relationship between tenure and earnings 
that rises after the sixth year in post in their RE regression. The upward movement in 
pay, they conjecture, is driven by bonuses that accompany the expiration of a contract 
or a ‘golden handshake’. We do find some evidence of this final payment influencing 
pay. The point estimate suggests that final payments to CEOs at the termination of 
their contract enhance earnings by just over 2%, on average and ceteris paribus. There 
is evidence that externally appointed CEOs are paid more than their internally 
appointed counterparts. The point estimate suggests that externally appointed CEOs 
are paid 5.7% more, on average and ceteris paribus.  
 
                                                 
15 The possibility that there are correlations between the professorship dummy and the previous work 
experience variables was explored using interaction terms. However, the results form this exercise also 
produced a negative coefficient. Moreover the interaction terms were found to be insignificant. 
16 Quadratic tenure terms were included in each specification to test for a non linear relationship. They 
were found to be statistically insignificant and are not included in the specifications reported.  
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Turning our attention to institution characteristics and their influence on pay we find 
very few significant coefficients on the controls included to proxy institutions’ size, 
hierarchical structure, and income. However, we do find that the proportion of 
undergraduate medical students to all undergraduate students has a positive and 
significant effect on CEO pay. These variables are included in the specifications 
reported in Table 1 to test for possible tournament effects. The point estimate suggests 
that as the proportion of medical undergraduates increases by one percentage point 
pay increases by just under 0.3%.  
 
The institution income variables employed include grants received from funding 
councils, tuition fees, sundry income and grants from research councils. These 
variables are included to proxy managerial performance. Specifications that included 
variables that proxied university size in terms of FTE undergraduates and 
postgraduates, and institution income variables were also estimated, although these 
are not reported here. These equations had a relatively high R
2 but many of the 
estimated coefficients were not individually significant at conventional levels. This 
highlighted a potential multicollinearity problem within the data. Indeed the number 
of FTE students and institutions’ income were found to be highly correlated. For 
example, the correlation coefficient between FTE undergraduates and funding council 
grants and tuition fees are 0.82, and 0.74 respectively. To overcome this problem we 
divided institution income from funding councils (grants and fees) and sundry income 
by FTE students, and grants from research councils by FTE research staff. However, 
the estimated coefficients on these variables fail to reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels.  
 
Average county level house price is entered into the regressions to control for regional 
economic conditions that impact on local living costs and the possibility that they 
impact on pay. A significant effect is detected at a conventional level in the FE 
specification. The point estimate suggests that a ten percent increase in average house 




                                                 
17 Pay change models were also estimated. The annual difference in the log of CEO pay was used as the 




The estimating equations that include controls for university type, size, hierarchical 
structure and both financial and the ‘other’ performance variables that were excluded 
in the primary analysis are reported in Table 2. These equations are estimated for ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ universities for which complete data are available. As the focus is on 
performance and pay we exclude controls for CEOs’ personal characteristics. Again 
the significance of the estimated coefficients is model dependent. On the basis of an 
F-test
18 and Hausman test
19 our preferred model is the FE specification and our 
discussion is focused on the estimated coefficients from this specification. 
 
We first note that the size variables employed fail to meet statistical significance at a 
conventional level. However, we do detect evidence of ‘tournaments’ affecting pay. 
The largest effect is associated with the presence of highly paid staff i.e. staff paid in 
excess of £100,000. The point estimate suggests that a one percentage point increase 
in the proportion of staff earning in excess of £100,000, on average and ceteris 
paribus, raises CEO pay by about 1.72%. Similarly the presence of senior academic 
staff also has a positive impact on pay. The point estimate suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in the proportion of senior academic staff to all academic 
staff, on average and ceteris paribus, raises pay by about 0.1%. There is evidence that 
an increase in the proportion of postgraduate medical students to all postgraduate 
students also increases pay. 
 
In terms of the financial performance variables we note that there is a positive and 
significant effect detected for the coefficient on the tuition fees variable. The point 
estimate suggests that a ten percent increase in tuition fees raises CEO pay, on 
average and ceteris paribus, by about 1.6%. This effect may also be picking up a size 
effect, where CEOs are compensated for success in increasing growth of their 
institution in a highly competitive higher education market. We also detect a negative 
relationship between overseas tuition fees and pay. The point estimate suggests that a 
one point increase in overseas tuition fees relative to income from funding councils 
(grants and tuition fees), reduces CEO pay, on average and ceteris paribus, by about 
                                                                                                                                            
These equations were poorly defined and no inference could be drawn. Conyon et al, (1995) discusses 
the problems associated with models of these kinds.   
18 F = 10.098 [0.00] 





0.5%. This result may suggest that some HEIs substitute domestic for international 
students when facing problems in terms of its perceived ‘quality’ that impacts on its 
domestic student recruitment and therefore its income and funding.  
 
The variables included to capture institution performance in terms of research and 
teaching quality, student attrition, and students’ participation in higher education (or 
the institution’s success in ‘widening participation’) all fail to reach statistical 




This paper empirically examined the pay determining process for CEOs of UK higher 
education institutions over a ten year period using a unique panel dataset. First, the 
relationship between CEO pay and their personal characteristics and the 
characteristics of the institution they lead was estimated. Second, we modelled the 
relationship between CEO pay and the performance of ‘old’ and ‘new’ universities 
using a subset of these data. In both these analyses three model specifications were 
employed, a pooled OLS, and institution random and fixed effects. Model 
specification tests were performed and it was clear that the institution fixed effects 
model performs better on statistical grounds.     
 
From the first stage of the analysis there was little evidence to suggest that institution 
characteristics (size, hierarchical structure and income) affect CEO pay. This 
particular result confirms those presented by Tarbert et al (2007), but contradicts 
those presented by Dolton and Ma (2003) who found some evidence that institutions’ 
size (proxied by cost centres, staffing levels, and the size of the student body) 
influenced CEO pay.  
 
We find evidence of gender bias in this particular labour market which is consistent 
with the findings of Dolton and Ma (2003). This result may seem surprising as we 
would expect there to be no significant difference between male and females as 
female CEOs are, a priori, self selecting. Furthermore, we would expect that high 
ability females would secure CEO appointment and with it a remuneration package 
comparable to that of males with similar attributes and responsibilities (see Lazear 
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and Rosen, 1990). However, this particular effect may also be driven by the small 
number of low paid females (69) who tend to head low pay ‘other’ HEIs. Separate FE 
regressions were estimated for each higher education sub-sector and a gender effect 
was detected in each of the sub-sectors except for the ‘old’ university sub-sector 
where no significant gender differential was detected.  
 
Those CEOs who were externally appointed are paid on average more than CEOs who 
are internally appointed. This result is in line with Chan (1996) who suggests that 
those externally appointed to senior positions within organisations are generally of 
superior quality in contrast to potential internal candidates. This feature will tend to 
drive up the pay of externally appointed CEOs, above those of their internal 
competitors. Murphy and Zabojnik (2003) also show that CEOs hired from the outside 
earn more than CEOs promoted internally. The results are also suggestive of a global 
shortage of suitable candidates for the post since candidates appointed from overseas 
are attracted to UK HEIs with the lure of a pay package that is considerably higher 
than those of their UK counterparts.  
 
Chief Executive Officers that have previous work experience in industry or in 
governmental higher education departments/bodies are awarded favourably for the 
skills and knowledge that they bring to the institution in question. This fact is 
reflected in the sums reported as being spent on ‘head hunters’ employed to find 
suitable candidates for the top job (see for example, ‘Masters of the hunt’, THES 30
th 
July 1999). There is clear evidence of a ‘golden handshake’ in the form of end of 
contract bonuses although this is against the guidelines set by the CUC if such 
payments are an ‘inappropriate use of public funds’ (CUC, 2004, p.26). 
 
From the secondary analysis we find that the presence of senior academic staff and 
highly paid staff in an institution has a positive impact on CEO pay as predicted by 
tournament theory. This confirms the results presented by Tarbert et al. (2007). 
However it is interesting to note that only a small proportion of CEOs (25%) reach 
their position through internal promotion. There is variation across the higher sub-
sectors. For instance, 18% of CEOs in ‘old’ universities were internally promoted and 
for ‘new’ universities the figure is about 34%. This may suggest that although 
‘tournaments’ are detected to impact positively on CEO pay their influence differs 
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across higher education sub-sectors, if internal promotion reflects success in a 
promotional tournament.  
 
Moreover, we find evidence that the level of tuition fees awarded to an institution by 
UK funding councils positively impacts on pay. This has important public policy 
implications. In the academic year 1997/98 students were expected to contribute up to 
£1000 to the cost of their tuition. In 2006/07 top-up fees were introduced and students 
are now expected to contribute up to £3000 each year towards the cost of their tuition. 
Some universities, particularly the Russell group of universities, see the introduction 
of these fees as necessary to bridge government ‘under-funding’. As CEO pay in 
higher education is influenced by tuition fees, as evidenced in this research, then we 
can infer that tuition fees may act as a constraint on CEO pay. This can be interpreted 
as an award for success in attracting students or more cynically as students funding 
CEOs’ pay awards.   
 
There has also been an increasing trend for HEIs to recruit students from overseas. 
The results from this research suggest that as the proportion of fees received from 
overseas (non-EU) students rise relative to tuition fees received by domestic students 
there is a reduction in pay. We interpret this result as an indication of institutions that 
are in financial trouble and in need of additional funding from alternative sources 
including income from overseas (see Dolton and Ma, 2003).   
 
There is little evidence to suggest that meeting current government policy objectives 
on widening participation impacts on CEO remuneration in ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
universities. Moreover there is also a lack of evidence to suggest that they are 
rewarded for the quality of teaching and research of their institutions.  
 
We were unable to test the theory of managerial power in this labour market due to 
the limited availability of data. In order to do so would require detailed data on the 
composition and pay of the members of the remuneration committee and other 
stakeholders that is not available for this research, but this does provide an avenue for 
future research. However, the evidence presented in this paper supports the view that 
the human capital characteristics of the CEO and the existence of ‘tournaments’ in are 
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Table 1: CEO wage equations 1997- 2006 
 
Variable







Constant  11.009 (0.199)***     10.141 (0.461)***  11.003 (0.314)*** 
Age   0.003 (0.001)***      0.0014 (0.0017)   0.0022 (0.0012)* 
Male 
 
 0.043 (0.016)***   0.080 (0.022) ***   0.053 (0.019)*** 
Education Background      
Doctoral Degree   0.006 (0.012)   0.003 (0.014)   0.004 (0.012) 
 Academic Discipline:     
Engineering   0.015 (0.015)  -0.011 (0.017)   0.009 (0.014) 
Social Science  -0.020 (0.010)**      0.005 (0.015)  -0.004 (0..013) 
Arts  -0.154 (0.026)***     -0.011 (0.022)  -0.088 (0.029)*** 
Science  f  f  f 
University Attended     
Ancient/Civic   0.026 (0.009)***  -0.007 (0.013)   0.019 (0.012) 
London  0.007 (0.023)   0.049 (0.019)***   0.024 (0.024) 
1960s/CAT
   0.061 (0.018)***   0.023 (0.032)   0.048 (0.023)** 
Overseas   0.142 (0.020)***   0.075 (0.034)**   0.118 (0.023)*** 
Other   0.070 (0.035)**   0.015 (0.032)   0.040 (0.046) 
Oxford/Cambridge 
 
f  f  f 
Esteem and Public Honours      
Professor   0.015 (0.030)    -0.035 (0.020)*  -0.001 (0.038) 
FRS   0.030 (0.010)***      0.003 (0.020)   0.020 (0.011)* 
Knighthood   0.070 (0.015)***   0.024 (0.018)   0.052 (0.018)*** 
Career History and Training      
Previous work experience     
Civil Service   0.055 (0.017)***   0.013 (0.024)   0.014 (0.020) 
Education   0.071 (0.028)**    0.075 (0.042)*   0.061 (0.035)* 
Industry   -0.037 (0.077)    0.083 (0.024)***   0.017 (0.079) 
Academia  f  f  f 
Training     
Previous CEO   0.068 (0.014)***   0.002 (0.021)   0.030 (0.014)** 
Previous deputy CEO   0.012 (0.010)  -0.010 (0.014)   0.003 (0.011) 
Current Employment     
New Appointment   0.002 (0.015)  -0.007 (0.014)  -0.003 (0.016) 
External Appointment   0.013 (0.013)   0.057 (0.015)***   0.020 (0.017) 
Tenure (years)   0.001 (0.002)   0.003 (0.003)   0.002 (0.003) 
Contract Terminated   0.016 (0.016)   0.022 (0.013)*   0.024 (0.014)* 
Institution Characteristics      
Russell/1994 Group  0.002 (0.013)   N/A   0.007 (0.021) 
Higher Educational Sub-sector     
Old  -0.083 (0.036)**   N/A  -0.052 (0.044) 
Medical/Business   0.043 (0.079)      N/A   0.080 (0.113) 
Arts  -0.070 (0.032)**   N/A  -0.162 (0.047)*** 
Other HEI  -0.125 (0.017)***   N/A  -0.149 (0.026)*** 
New (Ex Polytechnic)  f  f  f 
Institution Size Variables (lagged one year)    
Merger   0.003 (0.024)   0.031 (0.051)  0.023 (0.029) 
#Cost centres   0.007 (0.001)***   0.0003 (0.0016)  0.004 (0.001)*** 
(ln) FTE Academic Staff
   0.050 (0.012)***   0.019 (0.026)  0.059 (0.014)*** 
Institution Hierarchical Structure (lagged one year)    
Academic Staffing Structure     
Proportion of Senior 
Academic Staff
 
 -0.045 (0.046)   0.045 (0.091)   0.032 (0.058) 
Proportion of Professors
    0.448 (0.176)**  -0.218 (0162)  -0.104 (0.181) 
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Proportion of Staff 
Remuneration >100k
 
 -0.056 (0.203)   0.121 (0.216)   0.038 (0.183) 
Medical Students     
Proportion of  UG Medical 
students 
 0.037 (0.045)   0.269 (0.075)***  0.099 (0.060)* 
Proportion of PG Medical 
students 
 0.031 (0.062)  -0.090 (0.068)  -0.032 (0.077) 
Institution Income (lagged one year)    
Funding Council Grants
1 -0.022 (0.007)***  -0.012 (0.017)  -0.019 (0.010)* 
Tuition fees
1  0.024 (0.004)***   0.004 (0.015)   0.018 (0.006)*** 
Sundry income
1  0.001 (0.001)   0.001 (0.001)   0.001 (0.001) 
Research Council Grants
2 
   0.002 (0.002)   0.001 (0.001)   0.002 (0.002) 
Proportion of overseas tuition 
fees 
 
 0.196 (0.090)**   0.292 (0.358)   0.317 (0.190)* 
Regional  Variation (lagged one year)    
(ln) Real House Prices    0.008 (0.017)  0.101 (0.043)**  0.016 (0.026) 
Year Dummies      
1997  f  f  f 
1998  0.011 (0.024)    0.021 (0.030)   0.016 (0.027)  
1999   0.020 (0.019)     0.018 (0.021)     0.018 (0.017)    
2000   0.037 (0.018)**      0.043 (0.023)*   0.035 (0.016)**   
2001   0.079 (0.020)***      0.075 (0.025)***      0.079 (0.017)***    
2002   0.113 (0.018)***      0.097 (0.030)***      0.111 (0.015)***    
2003   0.144 (0.019)***      0.116 (0.037)***      0.140 (0.017)*** 
2004   0.163 (0.023)***      0.142 (0.050)***      0.169 (0.023)***    
2005   0.212 (0.021)***      0.160 (0.055)***      0.206 (0.021)***    
2006   0.207 (0.052)***      0.158 (0.091)*     0.202 (0.053)***    
      
Number of observations  1476  1476  1476 
R
2:   Overall 
   Within 











        Sigma_u 
        Sigma_e 













F / χ2 - tests for Categorical 
Variables 
    
Academic Discipline      13.93 [0.00]  0.36 [0.78]  12.54 [0.00]
3
University Attended    10.62 [0.00]  3.56 [0.00]  29.57 [0.00]
4
Work Experience       5.03 [0.00]  5.54 [0.00]  3.45 [0.32]
5
University Sub-sector  23.05 [0.00]  N/A  58.74 [0.00]
6
Year Dummies  18.84 [0.00]  5.60 [0.00]  151.56 [0.00]
7
Notes:   
All monetary variables are in real terms (1998=100). 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
1 Grants and Fees per FTE Student (£000’s) 
2 Research grants per FTE research staff (£000’s) 
3 Chi-squared statistic with 3 degree of freedom. 
4 Chi-squared statistic with 5 degree of freedom. 
5 Chi-squared statistic with 3 degree of freedom. 
6 Chi-squared statistic with 4 degree of freedom. 




Table 2: CEOs’ Earnings and HEI Performance 
 
Variable







Constant  10.461 (0.235)***      9.602 (0.758)***  10.003 (0.302)*** 
Institution Characteristics      
Russell/1994 Group  0.026 (0.017)   N/A  0.035 (0.036) 
University Type     
Pre 1960 University
2 -0.096 (0.030)***   N/A  -0.029 (0.045) 
University created in 1960s
3 -0.016 (0.030)      N/A   0.032 (0.045) 
Post 1992 University
4 f  f  f 
Institution Size Variables (lagged one year)    
Merger   0.044 (0.027)   0.008 (0.027)  0.008 (0.024) 
#Cost centres  -0.002 (0.002)   0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002) 
(ln) FTE Academic Staff
  -0.030 (0.032)   0.018 (0.027)   0.007 (0.027) 
Institution Hierarchical Structure (lagged one year)    
Academic Staffing Structure     
Proportion of Senior 
Academic Staff
4
 -0.119 (0.045)***   0.104 (0.064)*   0.043 (0.057) 
Proportion of Professors
    0.404 (0.181)**   0.018 (0157)  -0.099 (0.150) 
Proportion of Staff 
Remuneration >100k
 
  3.667 (1.043)***   1.719 (0.903)**   2.243 (0.732)*** 
Medical Students     
Proportion of  UG Medical 
students 
 0.033 (0.074)  -0.050 (0.126)  -0.016 (0.101) 
Proportion of PG Medical 
students 
 0.284 (0.085)***   0.183 (0.112)*   0.255 (0.098) 
Performance Variables (lagged one year)
1   
University Income     
(ln) Funding Council Grants
   0.085 (0.043)**   0.030 (0.067)   0.023 (0.050) 
(ln) Tuition fees
   0.051 (0.025)**   0.158 (0.044)***   0.094 (0.033)*** 
(ln) Sundry income
   0.012 (0.015)   0.016 (0.025)   0.012 (0.201) 
(ln) Research Council Grants
   0.002 (0.002)  -0.012 (0.017)  -0.005 (0.014) 
Overseas tuition fees (£000’s)
  -0.001 (0.156)  -0.491 (0.192)**  -0.240 (0.176) 
Research and Teaching Quality     
RAE Score
   0.006 (0.156)   0.001 (0.018)   0.003 (0.016) 
Teaching Assessment Score
  -0.003 (0.007)  -0.003 (0.009)  -0.003 (0.007) 
Student Attrition Rate
  -0.521 (0.168)***  -0.220 (0.218)  -0.260 (0.197) 
Graduate Unemployment Rate
  -0.016 (0.224)   0.277 (0.225)   0.254 (0.212) 
Student Participation Rates     
Low socio-economic group
   0.310 (0.160)**  -0.144 (0.158)  -0.045 (0.149) 
Low participating Area   0.162 (0.103)  -0.152 (0.290)   0.089 (0.189) 
Comprehensive Schools  -0.395 (0.101)***   0.079 (0.257)  -0.191 (0.185) 
Year Dummies      
1999  f  f  f 
2000  0.020 (0.018)    0.036 (0.018)**  0.031 (0.016)*  
2001   0.086 (0.020)***     0.100 (0.019)***    0.095 (0.017)***    
2002   0.097 (0.024)***     0.117 (0.028)***   0.109 (0.025)**   
2003   0.132 (0.026)***      0.150 (0.030)***      0.145 (0.026)***    
2004   0.144 (0.027)***      0.186 (0.032)***      0.178 (0.029)***    
2005   0.180 (0.026)***      0.224 (0.034)***      0.217 (0.029)*** 
2006   0.195 (0.026)***      0.252 (0.036)***      0.242 (0.030)***    
Number of observations  752  752  752 
R
2:   Overall 
   Within 













        Sigma_u 
        Sigma_e 













F / χ2 - tests for Categorical 
Variables 
    
University Type  14.68 [0.00]  N/A  3.81 [0.15]
 
Year Dummies  11.03 [0.00]  11.35 [0.00]  112.72 [0.00]
 
Notes:   
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
1 See table A3 for definition of performance variables. 
2Universities defined as Oxbridge, Ancient, Civic, and London universities. 
3Universities created in the 1960s as a result of the Robbins Report (1963). 
4 Universities classified as ex-polytechnics 
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Appendix: Data sources  
 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (various years), Pay Data for 
academics, CEOs and Senior Executives. Accessed at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=13101 
 
Halifax House Price Data (average UK county level house price). Accessed at 
http://www.hbosplc.com/economy/HistoricalDataSpreadsheet.asp 
 
Higher Education Performance Indicators.  
Accessed at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/learning/perfind/default.asp for 1996/97 to 
2001/02 and at www.hesa.ac.uk/pi/ for 2002/03 to 2004/05 
 
Higher Education Statistical Agency, (1998-2006). Reference Volume: STUDENTS in 
Higher Education Institutions. HESA. 
 
Higher Education Statistical Agency, (1998-2006). Reference Volume: RESOURCES 
of Higher Education Institutions, HESA. 
 
Higher Education Statistical Agency (1998-2006). Destinations of Leavers from 
Higher Education. HESA 
 
International Who’s Who (various years), Europa Publications Limited. 
 
Quality Assessment Exercise Results. Accessed at http://www.qaa.ac.uk/ 
 
Research Assessment Exercise Results. Accessed at http://www.hero.ac.uk/rae/ 
 
Retail Price Index. Data accessed at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDdownload2.asp 
 
Times Higher Education Supplement (THES). Vice Chancellors’ Salary Data 
accessed at http://www.thes.co.uk/statistics/ 
 
Who’s Who (1997-2006). An Annual Biography, A & C Black, London 
 
Who’s Who in British Art (various years). Hilmarton Manor Press  
 
Who’s Who (various years), Vice-Chancellors, Presidents, Principals, Rectors, The 






Table A1: Descriptive Statistics and Definition of Variables 
Variable




Annual Pay £ (1998=100)  117768.700 
(31326.31)
Natural log of CEO real annual salary (1998=100). 
CEOs’ PERSONAL CHARACTERITICS,  1996/97 – 2005/06 
General Characteristics  
Male  0.884 = 1 if Male,  0 = Female 




Age in years (year of observation minus year of birth). 
Educational Background   
Doctoral Degree  0.684 Holds a  PhD or equivalent (e.g. MD, DSci) 
Academic Discipline
   
Engineering     0.102   Engineer (or related disciplines e.g. urban planner or computer 
technologist). 
Social Science     0.453  Social scientist (historian, philosopher, sociologist, economist 
(or from business/finance), lawyer, educationalist).  
Arts
     0.146  Fine/modern artist, musician, dramatist, linguist, language 
scholar.  
Science
     0.299  Biologist, chemist, physicist, geologist, mathematician 
/statistician or with background in medical/ veterinary related 
disciplines.  
University Attended   
Ancient/Civic  0.351 Received highest degree from either an ancient (medieval) 
university or a civic ‘red brick’ university (i.e. universities 
established in late 19th Century to late1950s). 
London  0.175 Received highest degree from a London University College. 
1960s/CAT  0.072 Received highest degree from a university created in 1960s or 
from a former College of Advanced Technology (CAT) 
Overseas  university      0.038  Received highest degree from a foreign university, 
Other HE Institution
     0.069  Received highest degree from a former polytechnic, art 
college, teacher training institution etc (also includes the Open 
University).  
Oxford or Cambridge     0.295 Received highest degree from an Oxford/Cambridge College. 
Personal Esteem  
Professor     0.857  Holds a professorship at time of observation 
Fellow of a Royal Society/Academy       0.579  Awarded fellowship of Royal Society or British academy  
Knighthood     0.141  Knighted at time of observation 
Career History and Training  
Previous work experience  
Civil Servant
     0.066  Previously employed by civil service (excl. Dept. of 
Education) 
Education    0.026  Previously employed by official public education body e.g. 
DfES, HEFC, QCA etc.  
Industry
    0.055  Previously employed in the private sector with managerial 
and/or research responsibility. 
Academia
    0.853  Previously employed in the HE sector as lecturer, senior 
lecturer, or professor. 
   
Previous CEO
    0.121 Previously appointed as a Vice Chancellor, Principal, Rector; 
Director, Provosts or equivalent in another HE institution. 
Previous deputy CEO
  0.387 Previously appointed as a Pro Vice Chancellors, Assistant 
Principal, Deputy Director, or equivalent. 
Externally Appointed   0.769  Externally appointed to current post. 
Tenure (years in post)   5.814 
(3.854)
Years in current post (year of observation minus year of 
appointment). 








Institution Characteristics 1995/96 – 2004/05 
Russell/1994 Group  0.250 Member of Russell group of universities or a member of the 
1994 group of universities in year of observation.   
HEI Sub Sector 
   
Old  0.405 Includes: Oxbridge, Ancient and Civic Universities, London 
University Colleges (excl. medical colleges/schools), 
universities created in the 1960s and former CATs.  
Medical and Business Schools  0.039 Institution engages predominantly in medical/business 
research or related medical/business activities 
Colleges of Art, Music or Drama  0.122 Art or performing arts college (including music and dance). 
Other HEIs  0.156 Includes agricultural, teacher training colleges, and university 
colleges and other HE institutions 
New   0.277 Former polytechnics 
Size   
Number of Cost Centres  15.655 
(8.188)
Number of academic and administrative cost centres in year of 
observation. 




Total number of FTE academic staff including professors, 
readers, senior lecturers, lecturers, and researchers. 
Hierarchical Structure  
Academic Staffing Structure  
Proportion of Senior Academic 
Staff
 
0.171 Total FTE senior academic staff to all FTE academic staff . 
Proportion of Professors
  0.080 Total  FTE professorial staff to all FTE academic staff  
Proportion of Staff Remunerated > 
100k
 
0.006 Total FTE staff (academic/non academic, excl CEO) 
remunerated £100,000 per annum or more to all FTE academic 
staff  
Medical Students  
Proportion of  UG Medical 
students
 
0.144 Total FTE undergraduate medical and veterinary students 
(including those on medically related HE courses (e.g. 
dentistry and physiotherapy) to all FTE undergraduates. 
Proportion of  PG Medical 
students 
0.104 Total number of FTE postgraduate medical and veterinary 
students (including those on medically related HE courses (e.g. 
dentistry and physiotherapy) to all FTE postgraduates. 
Income (£000’s) 1998=100  
Funding Council Grants
  33068.009 
(27023.564)
Grants from all UK funding councils, and include block grants 
for teaching and research, and capital grants.  





Fees for full-time/part-time, degree and sandwich degree, 
diploma and other HE credit-bearing and non credit-bearing 





Income from services (e.g. consultancies, external course 
validation, and residential and catering services etc).  
Research grants & contracts
  13365.619 
(24964.089)
Income from externally sponsored research, and income from 
research councils and non-UK sources. 
Proportion of Overseas fees
  0.083 
(0.071) 
Overseas tuition fees to total income from UK funding council 
grants and tuition fees (as defined above). 
Real Regional House Prices 115604.9 
(52726.3)
Natural log of real average county level house prices (Halifax 
House Price Index, Halifax PLC) in year of observation 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Vice Chancellors  






Notes to Table:. 
1 Standard deviation given in parenthesis for continuous variables. All other variables are either dummy 
or categorical variables. 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics: Performance Variables for Old and New 
Universities 1997/98 – 2004/05 
Notes to Table: Standard deviation given in parenthesis below the relevant statistic. 
Variables




























  0.119 0.093  0.155  -2.589 
Graduate Unemployment rate






3:        
Proportion of student from lower social class  0.274  0.222  0.348  -5.226 
















 Number of Observations  752  440  312   
1 See Table A3 for definition of variables. 
2 z-scores are used to test the differences in proportions between old and new Universities, and t-tests 
are used to test the differences in means. The relevant critical value at 0.05 level for a two tailed test is 
±1.96. 
3Proportion of young full-time including students on foundation degree, HND, HNC and similar 






Table A3: Definitions of Performance Variables 
 
Research and Teaching Quality
RAE Score  Average institution research assessment exercise score per active researcher.  
Calculated by multiplying the scores (graded from 1 to 7) by the numbers of 
researchers in departments, summing this across all departments in an 
institution, and dividing by the total number of researchers of the institution. 
Scores are calculated for 1996 and 2001  
Teaching Assessment Score  Teaching Assessment Scores are based on mean of all TQA subject scores 
across the institution as published by the funding councils. Scores are 
reported out of a possible maximum of 24, in year of observation. 
Student Attrition Rate  Proportion of full-time first year degree students who have withdrawn from 
the institution during first year of study, whose destination are known, and are 
not in any form of employment or study in year of observation. 
Graduate Unemployment 
Rate 
Proportion of known student destinations one year after completion of first 
degree and represents those students not in full time or part time employment 
or study  
First Year Student 
Participation Rates
These variables are measured in terms of percentage points above or below 
the institution’s benchmark. The benchmark is calculated as a sector average 
which is then adjusted for subject of study, qualifications on entry, age on 
entry and region. 
 
Low socio-economic group
  Students classified as belonging to a low socio-economic group are those 
whose parents fall into the following occupational classes: (4) small 
employers and own account workers; (5) lower supervisory and technical 
occupations; (6) Semi-routine occupations; (7) Routine occupations and extra 
classification for unemployment (8) is also used in defining this group. The 
proportion is calculated as the number of students with this attribute to all 
first year enrolments in the year of observation 
Low participating Area  Areas for which the participation rate is less than two-thirds of the UK 
average rate are defined as low-participation neighbourhoods. Students are 
allocated to these neighbourhoods on the basis of their postcodes The 
proportion is calculated as the number of students with this attribute to all 
first year enrolments in the year of observation 
Comprehensive Schools  Students from comprehensive schools. The proportion is calculated as the 
number of students with this attribute to all first year enrolments in the year 
of observation 
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